



Consciousness and
Experiential Psychology
Annual Conference

Clifton Hill House
University of Bristol

6–8 September 2013



Acknowledgements

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<http://cep.bps.org.uk/cep/events/cep-annual-conference-2013/>



Consciousness and Experiential Psychology:
CEP 2013 Annual Conference

Clifton Hill House, University of Bristol

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Welcome!

Conference Organising Committee:

Susan A. J. Stuart (Section Chair)

Shanti Rao (Conference Treasurer)

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Tom Feldges (Submissions Recipient)

Participants

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Monia Brizzi	London Natural Health Centre
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Anna Ciaunica-Garrouy	Fribourg University
Matthew Crippen	American University in Cairo
Ana Lucia Fernández-Cruz	McGill University, Montreal
Thomas Feldges	University of Hull
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Sophie Foulkes	Independent
Natalie Gough	iOpener, Oxford
Helen Graham	University Centre Grimsby
Emily Hammond	University of Exeter
Joel Krueger	University of Exeter
Alan McAuliffe	Mary Immaculate College, University of Limerick
Nathan Michael	University Centre Grimsby
Santiago Arango-Muñoz	Ruhr University, Bochum
Simeon Nelson	University of Hertfordshire
Joel Parthemore	Lund University
John Pegler	Independent
Sonia Piczenko-Feldges	University Centre Grimsby
Bryony Pierce	University of Bristol
Shanti Rao	Independent
Vasudevi Reddy	University of Portsmouth
Ben Rumble	NHS Sussex Partnership Trust
Guy Saunders	University of the West of England
Elisabeth Schellekens	University of Durham
Stefan Schneider	University of Osnabrück
Cornell Schreiber	University of Vienna
Eric Schwitzgebel	University of California, Riverside
Roger Squier	British Psychological Society
Paul Stevens	Open University
Susan A. J. Stuart	University of Glasgow
Colwyn Trevarthen	University of Edinburgh
Elena Volkova	Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow
Kristen Volz	University of Tübingen

Programme

Friday 6 September 2013

- 18:00–20:15 Early registration
20:00– Buffet dinner

Saturday 7 September 2013

- 08:30–09:00 Registration, tea & coffee
09:00–10:00 **Keynote: Colwyn Trevarthen** (Edinburgh) *Neonatal Intelligence and Sensibility: Roots of Objective Knowledge, Articulate Representation of Shared Meanings, and Reflective Thought*
10:00–10:30 Coffee
10:30–12.30 **Joel Krueger** (Exeter) *Emotions, Music and the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition*
Alan McAuliffe (Limerick) *Meaning and qualia: Context and stimuli in decision making tasks*
Ben Rumble (NHS Sussex) *Multiplicity, Emotion and Cognitive Therapy: A Possible Role for Deleuze*
Nicholas Byrd (Colorado) *Can Selfish Goal Theory Do Without the Belief-Desire-Intention Model?*
12:30–13:30 Lunch
13:30–15:00 **Tony Cheng** (UCL) *Consciousness, Attention, and Visual Indexes*
Guy Saunders (UWE) *Landscape Imagined: How subjectivities are brought about*
Helen Graham, Sonia Pieczenko-Feldges & Nathan Michael (Grimsby UC) *Creativity and consciousness*
15:00–15:20 Tea
15:20–16:50 **Elena Volkova** (Russian Academy of Sciences) *Nonverbal Image as Expression of Consciousness*
Stefan Schneider, Benjamin Angerer & Cornell Schreiber (Osnabrück and Vienna) *Creative Imagery? A Joint Product of Intended Construction and Intuition*
Anna Ciaunica-Garrouy (EMC, Lyon) *Is the Social Brain an Intersubjective System?*
16:50–17:00 Short break
17:00–18:00 **Keynote: Elisabeth Schellekens** (Durham) *Explaining the Aesthetic: conceptual analysis and aesthetic psychology*
18:00–21:30 Wine Reception and Conference Dinner

Sunday 8 September 2013

Registration, tea & coffee	08:30–09:00
Keynote: Vasudevi Reddy (Portsmouth) <i>Response, engagement and mind</i>	09:00–10:00
Coffee	10:00–10:30
Matthew Crippen (American University in Cairo) <i>Perception of Emotional Expression and Some Lessons It Teaches</i>	10:30–12:00
Cornell Schreiber, Benjamin Angerer & Stefan Schneider (Vienna & Osnabrück) <i>An Experimental Paradigm for the Introspection of Mental Imagery in Problem Solving</i>	
Santiago Arango-Muñoz, Ana Lucía Fernández-Cruz & Kristen Volz (Bochum, McGill & Tübingen) <i>The Feeling of Error</i>	
Lunch	12:00–14:00
CEP AGM – all welcome	13:15–14:00
Tom Feldges (Hull) <i>Husserl's reduction & schizophrenia</i>	14:00–16:00
Joel Parthemore (Lund) <i>Drawing the Link Between Concepts and Consciousness</i>	
Monia Brizzi & Simeon Nelson (London Natural Health Centre & Hertfordshire) <i>Beyond Words: Imagination, Tacit Knowing and the Art of Subjectification</i>	
Susan Stuart (Glasgow) <i>Enkinaesthetic polyphony as the underpinning for first-order languaging</i>	
Tea	16:00–16:30
Keynote: Eric Schwitzgebel (UC Riverside) <i>Variability in Self-Described Emotional Phenomenology: Error or Real Individual Differences?</i>	16:30–17:30
Closing remarks and thanks	17.30

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Keynote: Variability in Self-Described Emotional Phenomenology: Error or Real Individual Differences?

Eric Schwitzgebel

University of California, Riverside, United States

Self-reports of emotional phenomenology vary enormously between individuals. Some introspectors, such as James, report only the phenomenology of bodily arousal and activity, while others, such as Lambie and Marcel, report a wide variety of dimensions in emotional experience. People interviewed using Hurlburt's Descriptive Experience Sampling vary enormously in the frequency with which they report emotional phenomenology or "feelings" and in what they say about the phenomenal character of those feelings. The question arises: To what extent does this variation in report reflect real differences in the frequency and character of people's emotional phenomenology vs. to what extent does this variation reflect only differences in describing what is at root a similar range of experiences? We are not yet in a good position confidently to answer this question. If physiological differences correlate with differences in introspective report, that would provide some evidence favoring the individual differences hypothesis. On the other hand, the apparent difficulty and instability of reporting provide some evidence favoring a more skeptical attitude toward differences in reporting.

Beyond words: Imagination, tacit knowing and the art of subjectification

Monia Brizzi, Simeon Nelson

London Natural Health Centre; University of Hertfordshire

‘Consciousness seems to obscure the actions it perceives, and only when they occur without it are they purer, more effective, more vital’ (Plotinus, tr. Buber, Farber 1976:5).

Lived experience has both natural-scientific and human-scientific aspects. It also has aspects which precede and substantiate but entirely escape the certainty and certain-uncertainty of both types of science because despite being directly felt in a bodily and affective manner they are invisible, intangible, relational, unintentional, prereflective and nonverbal. These uncertainly-uncertain aspects constitute an imaginative border matrix that generates both the body and consciousness but is particularly hard to access because in grounding, materialising and mediating them its liminal qualities inhere everywhere and are not gathered in a simple location. Being a middle or third dimension diffused in-between matter and mind implies that they can’t feasibly be fully given in or boiled down to either hard (the physicalist organism) or soft (the psyche) poles alone for, as their middle, they exceed and withdraw the actualities of mere presence separate from potentiality. The ambiguity of these ubiquitous experiential structures of the threshold defy scientific representation and the sedimentations of ordinary perception but can be rescued through the sensorial imaginary of tacit knowledge where the tensions in the structure of intelligibility are preserved. Imagination is the body of subjectification, its creativity and art.

The ‘actual cannot be reduced to mere matter of fact in divorce from the potential’ (Whitehead, 1929: 227) and the liminal territories prior to substance/process and subject/object consciousness splits are reflectively vague and conceptually indeterminate despite being really primal and factually felt, primordially sculpting and being sculpted in our ongoing experience of being: ‘transcendence does not consist of objectification but objectification presupposes transcendence’ (Heidegger in May 1983: 149). We simply don’t have the words to capture the form of their elusive yet concrete materiality in a certain and fully-formed way, we don’t have names to name the unnameable. They are the heart of subjectification’s matter, a fact yet not matter of fact. The simultaneously concrete and ineffable, actual and potential, unified and contrasted, constant and transitory reality of the whole cannot be entirely present at hand and spatialised, it is not given in representation but is able to overflow and stand revealed in expression only insofar as this ‘is essentially open onto a totality that is itself open’ (Deleuze, 1966: 105).

Throughout time human beings have sought a structure to tap into and communicate the more foundational and embodied qualities of being but in this quest have confused things even more. With a misplaced emphasis on logos and language they have constructed lofty and barely decipherable intellectual highways that can all too often only be understood by a specific niche of experts, like for example in the specialist jargon in science, philosophy and psychotherapy. By responding to ‘the need to bring to language modes of being that ordinary vision obscures or even represses’ (Ricoeur, 1976: 60), imagination is much more than mere luxury, embellishment, frivolity, distraction or even escapism from more serious concerns. Its art grants the disclosure of commonly hidden aspects of embodied experience and enables us to feel and make sense of their tensions in an immediate and personally engaged way through the sensuous experience of being bodily, emotionally and spiritually affected and called into activity, into question and into perceptivity by the pathic qualities of the world. Art’s *veritas aethetica* directly illuminate the tensions inherent in the structure of intelligibility, letting them tacitly speak to bodily perception. For the unspoken imaginary of affective undergoing sustains and informs the retroactive verbalisations of consciousness and gnostic knowing, it is their humus but remains unexhausted by them.

There is controversy over the basis for young children's experience of themselves and other people as separate yet related individuals, each with a mental perspective on the world – and over the nature of corresponding deficits in autism. It has become fashionable to think of limitations in psychological perspective-taking among autistic children (AC hereafter) as signs of lacks in their “theory of mind” (ToM) abilities (Baron-Cohen et al 1985; Leslie 1994), i.e. a “Mindblindness” deficit in having metarepresentational mental states. Typically, the litmus false-belief test (Wimmer & Perner 1983) uses elicited-response task in which children answer a direct question about an agent's false belief. However, recent studies using spontaneous-response tasks which include violation-of-expectation looking paradigm (VOE),¹ strongly suggest that this ability could be present much earlier in typically developing children (Onishi & Baillargeon 2005) while it is missing in AC (Senju et al. 2010). Here I defend the idea that AC might suffer from a specific “relational self impairment” (RSI) which causes ToM deficits. In other words, the intersubjective relatedness of the self is foundational for and not merely subsidiary to the development of representational skills.

This paper is structured as follows: in section 1 I discuss the use of the term “metarepresentations” in ToM paradigm and argue in line with Scott (2001) that a confusion has been made between “dual representations” and “metarepresentations”. Then I will interpret recent findings of Onishi & Baillargeon (2005) and Senju et al (2010) as corroborating the idea that ToM fails to encapsulate the relational aspects of the self. Part 2 builds upon the premise that “one cannot be a self on one's own” (de Haan 2010) and argues that the “minimal self” is primarily a “relational self”, i.e. constitutively dependent upon “participatory sense-making” interactions (de Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007).

Then I review behavioural and neural evidence supporting the RSI hypothesis. Indeed, fMRI evidence is accumulating that infants' brain organization in typically developing children may well have adapted to be an “intersubjective system” (Aitken & Trevarthen 1997, Tzourio-Mazoyer et al. 2002). Furthermore, developmental studies seem to suggest that higher level cognitive processes are strongly affected by the history of social interactions (Jaffe et al. 2001, Hobson 2002, Trevarthen 2005). Finally, this paper supports the conclusion that what is missing among AC highlights what is present among children without autism, namely forms of emotional engagement through which a child is moved in psychological attitudes by the bodily expressed attitudes of someone else (Hobson 2012).

¹VOE tasks test whether children look longer when agents act in a manner that is inconsistent with their false beliefs.

Emotions on Masks: Perception of Emotional Expression and Some Lessons It Teaches

Matthew Crippen

Department of Philosophy, American University in Cairo, Egypt

In their 2012 article, “Holistic person processing: Faces with bodies tell the whole story,” Hillel Aviezer and colleagues noted that researchers investigating facial expressions have mostly considered “the face and the body as discrete perceptual units, focusing on the processing of each source in isolation” (p. 20). They further reported that their experiments “show that faces and bodies are processed as a single unit” (p. 20), so that body language can have a striking effect on how we perceive facial expressions. However, while adding much to the understanding of emotional expression, this is not the whole story, for as filmmakers have long recognized and the occasional psychologist observed, the contexts in which we encounter bodies and faces also bears on the appearance of emotional expression.

Integrating examples from filmmaking, results from experimental psychology and phenomenological and pragmatic accounts of emotion and perception, I examine instances in which situations shape how we perceive emotional expression. I begin with illustrations of the “Kuleshov effect” – a cinematic phenomenon wherein audiences perceive different emotions on performers’ faces when identical shots of them are contextualized in different situations. I next consider insights that Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 1947 “Film and the New Psychology” drew from this phenomenon. Here I focus on how the Kuleshov effect reinforces two positions advanced in phenomenological and pragmatic literature: first, that we are ill-equipped to register isolated objects or events; and, second, that reducing emotions to purely internal, subjective happenings reduces them to almost nothing. Then, consolidating lessons from cinema and the aforementioned literature, along with more recent psychological and philosophical research, I develop a position hinted at by John Dewey nearly a century ago, and loosely echoed by more recent thinkers such as Herman Schmitz and Gernot Böhme, namely, that worldly situations, in a manner of speaking, have objective emotional qualities.

The notion that worlds, as opposed to isolated faces, can be primary determinants of emotional expression suggests a rethinking of the view, which has received increasing support since the 1960s, that basic emotions such as fear, anger, disgust and happiness have fairly specific, universal and involuntary corresponding facial expressions. It further suggests rethinking the thesis, popularized by Paul Ekman, that basic facial expressions cannot be easily faked, so that, for instance, security personnel can learn to detect non-genuine expressions. It is not so much the thesis itself that is problematic, however, but that professional and especially popular media promulgate it in ways that lead us to neglect frequent cases in which faces do not as much express as reflect emotional qualities of situations. Indeed, an interesting subset of cases exists in which emotions are reflected on the faces of performers literally wearing masks. Extending phenomenological and pragmatic theories that hold that the manner in which we register elements within a field is determined by our perception of the whole, and relating these ideas to 20th century physics and the position that properties are effects of interrelationships, I argue that emotional expressions that appear as a consequence of people’s placement within situations need not be illusions. On the contrary, a speculative case can be made that they have the same ontological status as colour and other qualities of objects perceived in the world.

Notes

 Consciousness & Experiential
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